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I. INTRODUCTION
State legislatures are becoming increasingly dependent on legalized
gambling revenues.1 In the past twenty-five years, the number of states that
1. See Derrick Z. Jackson, Gambling on Gaming Revenues, B. GLOBE, Sept. 19,
2007,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2007/09/19/gambling_on_gaming
_revenues/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2011).
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have some form of legalized gambling increased from three to forty-eight,
Hawaii and Utah being the only two holdouts.2 The American Gaming Association (AGA) reported that, in 2007, gambling was over a $92 billion
industry,3 which is more than the combined net income of the top three U.S.
oil companies in that same year.4 While the revenue benefits to U.S. governments are undoubtedly well-recognized,5 the adverse social impacts associated with this type of revenue generation are becoming increasingly
self-evident.6 The National Gambling Impact Study Commission (NGISC
or “the Commission”), which was designated by Congress in 1996 to study
the social and economic impacts of legalized gambling,7 reported that “families of pathological gamblers suffer from a variety of financial, physical,
and emotional problems, including divorce, domestic violence, child abuse
and neglect, and a range of problems stemming from the severe financial
hardship that commonly results from problem and pathological gambling.”8
Despite the Commission’s recommendation of a “pause in the expansion of
gambling,”9 states continue to legalize gambling at alarming rates.10
The high revenue generated by legalized forms of gambling comes at
the price of endangering the problem (i.e., pathological) gambler and his or
2. Kevin Peterson, 48 States Ranking in Gambling Proceeds, STATELINE.ORG, May
23, 2006, http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=114503 (last visited Jan. 10,
2011).
3. Am.
Gaming
Ass’n,
Gambling
Revenue:
Current-Year
data,
http://www.americangaming.org/Industry/factsheets/statistics_detail.cfv?id=7 (last visited
Jan. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Am. Gaming Ass’n]. The AGA reported that in 2007, the combined gross gambling revenue (the total amount wagered minus the winnings returned to the
gambler) for card rooms, commercial casinos, Indian casinos, legal bookmaking, lotteries,
pari-mutuel waging, charitable games and bingo was $92.27 billion. Id.
4. See Robert Pirog, Oil Industry Profit Review 2007, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS,
Apr. 4. 2008, at 2, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/103679.pdf (reporting that
Exxon Mobile, BP, and Chevron had a total net income of just over $76.5 billion in 2007).
5. See, e.g., Am. Gaming Ass’n, supra note 3.
6. See Nat’l Gambling Impact Study Comm’n Final Report, at 4-1, available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/fullrpt.html (reporting that in 1997, there were
7.5 million American adult pathological or problem gamblers. This did not include the 7.9
million American adolescent pathological or problem gamblers in the same year) [hereinafter NGISC Final Report].
7. See Letter from Kay C. James, Chairman NGISC, to the President, Congress,
Governors, and Tribal Leaders (June 18, 1999) (on file with author), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/intro.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Kay C. James].
8.
NGISC Final Report, supra note 6, at 4-13 (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING: A CRITICAL REVIEW 5-2 (National Academy Press
1999)) (citation omitted).
9.
Letter from Kay C. James, supra note 7.
10. See, e.g., 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-40/85 (2008). Chapter 230 covers Illinois
gaming legislation. Id. It begins with the earliest legislation in 1975, entitled the Illinois
Horse Racing Act, and extends through the most recent legislation in 2009, entitled the
Illinois Video Gaming Act. Id.
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her family, not to mention the surrounding community and economy.11
Moreover, most gambling legislation does not afford the pathological
gambler any recourse against a casino, for example, when that gambler
loses money due to his or her addiction.12 Claims against casinos for recovery of gambling losses, however, have been made under traditional negligence theories in the past.13 These unsuccessful attempts to get the judiciary
to stretch common law negligence principles to encompass recovery of
gambling losses is the only way in which the pathological gambler may be
directly protected.14 Courts have been unwilling to accept these types of
arguments due to the lack of legislative intent in the highly-regulated area
of legalized gambling.15
To fully understand the effect that legalized gambling has on the pathological gambler, imagine a situation in which an Atlantic City casino
provides Willy Wagers, one of its patrons, with a complimentary room, free
drinks, and other perks for a full month while he is in town, but only under
the condition that he gambles every day. After a while, Willy finds himself
ill due to all the free alcohol and late nights at the blackjack table, but continues to gamble after casino employees remind him of their agreement.
After Willy loses most of his money, the casino agrees to fly him back to
his New York City bank in a helicopter, so he can retrieve a large sum from
his savings account. Willy’s family hears of this, and immediately go to the
casino to try to prevent it from letting him gamble and explaining that Willy
is a “pathological gambler.” Willy realizes that he has a gambling problem
and enrolls in a state-run “self-exclusion” program, which indicates to all
11. See NGISC Final Report, supra note 6, at 4-1, 7-1.
12. See infra notes 79-160 and accompanying text.
13. See Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995);
GNOC Corp. v. Aboud, 715 F. Supp. 644, 655 (D.N.J. 1989); see also infra notes 93-119
and accompanying text. In some cases, pathological gamblers have become indebted to a
casino and named as a defendant in a lawsuit by the casino seeking payment of the debt. See,
e.g., Greate Bay Hotel & Casino v. Tose, 34 F.3d 1227, 1228 (3d Cir. 1994).
14. See generally Jeffrey C. Hallam, Comment, Rolling The Dice: Should Intoxicated Gamblers Recover Their Losses?, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 240 (1990). Illinois offers other
forms of protection to people who may have a gambling problem. Am. Gaming Ass’n, Responsible
Gaming
Statutes
and
Regulations,
at
ii
(3d
ed.
2008),
http://www.americangaming.org/assets/files/Statutes_and_Regs_FINAL_022009.pdf [hereinafter Responsible Gaming Statutes and Regulations]. For example, the state provides a 1800 help line number, employee training regarding problem gambling, public awareness,
and, most significantly, a self-exclusion program. See id.; see also infra notes 165-78 and
accompanying text. The current protection offered in Illinois, however, is discredited when
compared to other states that utilize additional forms of protection like advertising restrictions, alcohol service restrictions, credit restrictions, limited stakes, marketing, and problem
gambling treatment funding. See Responsible Gaming Statutes and Regulations, at ii.
15. See, e.g., Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 293; see also infra notes 79-119 and accompanying text.
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the casinos in his state that he has a gambling problem and wishes to be
evicted should he ever enter a casino. Despite his efforts to rid himself of
his destructive habits, Willy caves into the pressure to gamble once again
and enters a casino to start gambling. The casino, enjoying all the money
Willy is wagering, decides to ignore the family and Willy’s wishes and
allows him to gamble anyway. After more losses, Willy finds himself out of
money, in debt to the casino, and a defendant in a lawsuit by the casino to
recover his debt.
The hypothetical set out above touches on some of the shocking facts
you will find in current jurisprudence that has dealt with the intoxicated
gambler defense,16 and the result is that Willy will not have a claim or defense against the casino.17 Most courts have agreed that legalized gambling
is too highly regulated to proffer any sort of legislative intent regarding
private causes-of-action against casinos for recovery of gambling debt, in
any situation, when the legislation itself is silent on the issue.18 This situation leaves the pathological gambler little recourse against a casino when
their conduct is as extreme as in the above example.19
Illinois may be the new leader in American gambling as it continues
its trend of decriminalizing gambling to raise money to revive its economy.
This Comment argues that the Illinois General Assembly has been, and
continues to be, careless with regard to protecting pathological gamblers
from the increasingly dangerous policy of legalized gambling. Part II of this
Comment resurfaces some of the adverse social impacts that legalized gambling has on the pathological gambler, and maintains that pathological
gamblers must be afforded statutory protection. Part II looks to Illinois, a
jurisdiction that is arguably decriminalizing gambling more rapidly than
any other state, while offering little protection to pathological gamblers.
16. See Taveras v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., No. 07-4555 (RMB), 2008 WL 4372791
at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2008).
Plaintiff alleges that certain casino employees “refused to
permit [her] family members from taking her home” . . . and
continued to allow her to gamble in spite of clear indications
that she was a compulsive gambler, confirmed by information
about her condition provided to casino employees by her
brother.
Id. (citation omitted). See also GNOC Corp. v. Aboud, 715 F. Supp. 644, 646-48 (D.N.J.
1989) (“[The vice president of Golden Nugget] authorized the Golden Nugget to provide and
pay for Mr. Aboud to be flown by helicopter to his bank in Queens, New York . . . so that
Mr. Aboud could withdraw more money and bring it back to Atlantic City.”); see also Merrill v. Trump Indiana, Inc., 320 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is undisputed that Merrill
himself, in 1996, wrote to the casino asking that he be evicted from it if he ever showed up
to gamble.”).
17. See, e.g., Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 294.
18. See infra notes 93-119 and accompanying text.
19. See generally Hallam, supra note 14, at 254.
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Part III of this Comment addresses what theories of liability could potentially be available to the pathological gambler in Illinois. Part III relies on
New Jersey, a jurisdiction well-familiarized with legalized gambling, to
address dram shop liability, the typical recourse problem-gamblers have
sought in the past for protection against casinos, and why that form of protection has failed. Part III also argues that the Illinois Dram Shop Act, like
that of New Jersey, is not a source of support for pathological gamblers,
and similarly, argues that other theories of liability are inadequate. Finally,
Part IV argues that in order to minimize the social impacts of legalized
gambling, the Illinois General Assembly should amend (and thereby revive)
the Illinois Loss Recovery Act and impose a duty of care on casinos to protect pathological gamblers from harming their economy. Part IV distinguishes between three types of gamblers, discusses which type of gambler
should be afforded protection, and in what circumstances a duty of care
should arise. Part V of this Comment concludes that the Illinois General
Assembly must be the governmental branch to initiate the changes, because
the judiciary’s hands are tied in regards to these matters.
II.
A.

HISTORICAL CONTEXTS OF PROBLEM GAMBLING AND INDUSTRY
EXPANSION

THE SOCIAL IMPACTS OF LEGALIZED GAMBLING

20

Pathological (or “compulsive”) gambling has been defined as “the uncontrollable urge to keep gambling despite the toll it takes on your life.”21
As states are becoming more dependent on gambling revenue, the risks,
costs, and effects of pathological gambling are increasing substantially.22
The National Gambling Impact Study Commission was designated by Congress to “conduct a comprehensive legal and factual study of the social and
20. While this section only contains a small sample of information on the social
effects of gambling, a complete analysis is available in John Warren Kindt, UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL GAMBLING REPORT SERIES, Research Editors Doctoral Directorate (REDD)
on Gambling (William S. Hein & Co., 2008). This collection takes a comprehensive look at
many issues regarding legalized gambling. Id. In this collection, Professor John Warren
Kindt republished many government documents and academic source materials pertaining to
pathological gambling. Id.
21. Mayo Clinic Staff, Diseases and Conditions, Compulsive Gambling: Definition,
MAYOCLINIC.COM, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/compulsive-gambling/DS00443 (last
visited Jan. 10, 2011). The American Psychiatric Association stated that pathological gamblers “may be preoccupied with gambling (e.g., reliving past gambling experiences, planning
the next gambling venture, or thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble).”
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DSM-IV: DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 616 (4th ed. 1994).
22.
NGISC Final Report, supra note 6, at 4-19.
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economic impacts of gambling in the United States . . . .”23 The NGISC
Final Report revealed that in 1997, there were “7.5 million American adult
problem and pathological gamblers . . . [and] 7.9 million American adolescent problem and pathological gamblers.”24 Most communities report[ed]
that “the number of problem and pathological gamblers increased after the
introduction of nearby casino gambling.”25
When assessing the cost of pathological gambling, the National Research Council reported that “[a]s access to money becomes more limited,
gamblers often resort to crime in order to pay debts, appease bookies, maintain appearances, and garner more money to gamble.”26 The same study
reported that “one-fourth to one-third of gamblers in treatment in Gamblers
Anonymous reported the loss of their jobs due to gambling.”27 Pathological
gambling has also been linked to bankruptcy, embezzlement, and theft.28
Furthermore, the NGISC Final Report concluded that the “gambling industry, government, foundations, and other sources of funding should step forward with long-term, sustained support.”29 Significantly, the Commission
determined that the number of pathological gamblers will likely increase
with the introduction of additional gambling opportunities.30
With all of the academic studies, reports, statistics, and other information regarding the social effects of legalized gambling, state legislatures and
smaller governments are thinking twice about gambling legislation to generate revenue.31 The persons most directly affected by gambling decrimina-

23. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 sec. 4(a)(1) (2008).
24.
NGISC Final Report, supra note 6, at 4-1.
25. Id. at 4-4.
26. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING: A CRITICAL REVIEW
160 (National Academy Press 1999) (citation omitted).
27. Id. at 161 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
28. See NGISC Final Report, supra note 6, at 4-13, 4-15.
29. Id. at 4-19.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., DuPage Becomes First County in Illinois to Ban Video Gambling
(Aug.
11,
2009),
available
at
Machines,
DUPAGECO.ORG
http://www.dupageco.org/pressDetail.cfm?doc_id=4190. For example, DuPage County
decided to not incorporate the Illinois Video Gaming Act because of the social ills that it
would create, and attacked the Illinois General Assembly for passing the bill without considering the consequences. Id. (“The state passed this bill without weighing the consequences,
without an implementation plan or budget, and without reliable revenue estimates. The legislation is reckless at best, making it incumbent on County and Municipal governments to
stand up and say ‘no.’”); see also John Pastuovic, Illinois Gaming Board Warned that Video
Gambling Machines will Create Uncontrollable Situation, CHI. CRIME COMM’N, Aug. 25,
2009,
available
at
https://www.chicagocrimecommission.org/util/Press/FinalIllinoisGamingBoardVideoGambli
ngRelease_2_.pdf [hereinafter Video Gambling Machines will Create Uncontrollable Situation].
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lization, however, are the pathological gamblers themselves.32 A moratorium on gambling expansion, as recommended by the Commission, will not
protect that person when other forms of gambling are still utilized in the
state.33 With increases in decriminalized gambling in Illinois, what protection is offered to the pathological gambler?
B.

THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF GAMBLING IN ILLINOIS

Gambling in Illinois has expanded,34 and continues to expand,35 while
pathological gamblers are afforded even less protection than ever.36
1.

The Illinois Video Gaming Act

In July of 2009, the new Illinois governor, Patrick Quinn, signed into
law H.B. 255, which created the Illinois Video Gaming Act.37 This new law
allows for certain bars and restaurants anywhere in the state to have video
gambling machines (VGMs) in their establishments.38 The VGMs allow
patrons to play casino-style games like blackjack, line-up, and video poker
without having to go a licensed casino.39 The stated purpose of the law was
to raise money for the Illinois Capital Construction Program.40
Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) stated that VGM gaming was the “crackcocaine” of the gambling industry,41 because that form of gambling caused
players to bottom out more quickly than traditional forms of gambling.42
Now that traditional forms of gambling—such as casinos, racetracks, and
32. See, e.g., NGISC Final Report, supra note 6, at 4-4 (“[T]he presence of a gambling facility within 50 miles roughly doubles the prevalence of problem and pathological
gamblers.”).
33. See id. at 4-19 (indicating that the prevalence of problem gambling rises and
falls with the opportunity to gamble).
34. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
35. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
36. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
37.
H.B. 255, 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); Act effective July 13, 2009,
Pub. Act 96-34 (codified at 230 ILCS 40/1-40/85 (2010)); Illinois Liquor Control Commission News, Q&A on the Video Gaming Act, Vol. 30, at 1 (2009),
http://www.state.il.us/lcc/DOCS/Fall09web.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Illinois Liquor Control Commission News].
38.
Illinois Liquor Control Commission News, supra note 37, at 1.
39. See Marcus Webb, Illinois Gov. Signs Video Lottery Bill into Law, 49 VENDING
TIMES, No. 7, July 2009.
40.
Illinois Liquor Control Commission News, supra note 37, at 1.
41.
Press Release from Senator Jon Kyl, Not a Safe Bet (Aug. 17, 2001) (on file
with author); see also, Bennett Liebman, Not All That It’s Cracked Up To Be, GOV’T L. CTR.
ALBANY
L.
SCH.,
2
(Aug.
16,
2004),
available
at
OF
http://www.governmentlaw.org/files/crack_cocaine.pdf [hereinafter Bennett Liebman].
42. Bennett Liebman, supra note 41, at 1.
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sports betting—are already legal in many states, some are turning to VGMs
to generate even more gambling revenue.43 The social problems that this
type of gambling creates, however, are starting to catch the ears of government leaders.44 The Illinois Gaming Board met to attack the new Illinois
Video Gaming Act45 and stated that “any short-term revenue gains [from
the Act] would be far exceeded by the long-term cost to society.”46
2.

Illinois Senate Bill 74447

The Illinois General Assembly is seeking to expand the decriminalization of gambling by making Illinois “the largest revenue-producing gaming
state in America,”48 surpassing both Nevada and New Jersey as “the number one gaming-dependent State”49 in the nation. Senate Bill 744, which is
currently engrossed in the House,50 allows for three land-based casinos to
be constructed in Northern Illinois (one of which will be in Chicago), as
well as slot-machines at race-tracks.51 The idea of bringing land-based casinos to America’s third-largest city is not new to Illinois,52 but the previous
legislation failed to become law.53 Illinois’ current attempt to pass land43.
44.

See, e.g., 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/1-40/85 (2010).
See Video Gambling Machines will Create Uncontrollable Situation, supra note

31.
45. 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/1-40/85 (2010).
46. Video Gambling Machines will Create Uncontrollable Situation, supra note 31.
The Board also concluded that “communities can expect to experience an increase in crime
and a rise in other social ills connected with this type of gambling expansion . . . .” Id.
47. S.B. 744, 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009). At the time this article was
written, S.B. 744 was engrossed in the House of Representatives. Since then, the bill has
passed, but after several amendments, it only made small changes to Illinois gambling laws.
See Acr effective Aug. 23, 2010, Pub. Act 96-1479. The Illinois Senate recently passed
Senate Bill 737, however, which would permit five new casinos in Illinois (one in Chicago,
two in the Chicago suburbs, one in Rockford near the Wisconsin border, and one in Danville
located near the Indiana border). Kevin McDermott, Illinois Gambling-Expansion Bill Advances, STLTODAY.COM, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/politicalfix/article_8b873230-191c-11e0-82b5-00127992bc8b.html. Senate Bill 737, therefore,
should be referenced anytime this article refers to Senate Bill 744.
48.
Sen. Deb. on S.B. 744, 96th Gen. Assem., 33 (May 22, 2009) (Statement of Sen.
Dillard), available at http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans96/09600055.pdf; see
supra note 47.
49.
Sen. Deb. on S.B. 744, 96th Gen. Assem., 33 (May 22, 2009) (Statement of Sen.
Dillard), available at http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans96/09600055.pdf; see
supra note 47.
50.
S.B. 744, 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); see supra note 47.
51. Id.
52. See H.B. 4939, 94th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2006); see also S.B. 0019,
94th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2005).
53. See H.B. 4939, 94th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2006); see also S.B. 0019,
94th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2005).
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based casino legislation focuses on stealing gaming business from neighboring jurisdictions,54 which have “declared war” on Illinois by constructing casinos that border the state.55 The growth in tourism dollars is expected
to spur economic growth in one of the worst economic crises Illinois has
ever seen.56
3.

The Illinois Loss Recovery Act

Like most states, Illinois initially prohibited almost all forms of gambling.57 The Illinois Loss Recovery Act was enacted to protect its citizens
from the adverse effects of organized crime, which was thought to be inextricably linked to professional gambling activities.58 This act criminalized
most forms of gambling59 and allowed patrons of illegal gambling activities
(not exempted under the act) to recover their losses from the bet-taker in a
civil cause-of-action.60
In Moushon v. AAA Amusement, Inc., Gloria Moushon lost a total of
$1,989 at the defendant’s tavern to video gaming machines that operated in
that tavern.61 Gloria exhibited typical pathological gambling behavior—she
lost her money over a five month period at defendant’s tavern, while playing VGMs “four to six days [per week] for approximately four hours at a
time . . . .”62 Whenever she won the game, she would “put . . . [her winnings] back in the machine and keep playing . . . .”63 Gloria filed suit in
1994 against both the tavern owner and the corporation that provided the
54. See Sen. Deb. on S.B. 744, 96th Gen. Assem., 34 (May 22, 2009), available at
http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans96/09600055.pdf; see supra note 47.
55. Id. The bill proposes putting one land-based casino in Winnebago County, one
casino in Lake County, and one in the City of Chicago. Id. at 32. The legislation would also
allow the current riverboat casinos to become land-based if they desire. Id. The bill was
introduced after legislators recognized that Illinois’ five bordering states had placed casinos
just past the Illinois border to “attract Illinois taxpayers . . . to leave Illinois and go to our
surrounding states.” Id. at 34 (statement of Senator Syverson).
56. Id. at 35.
57. See, e.g., Illinois Loss Recovery Act, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28 (2008).
58. See Illinois Loss Recovery Act, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28-1.1(a) (2009) (stating that the purpose of the statute is “to restrain persons from engaging in the business of
gambling for profit in this State,” after “[r]ecognizing the close relationship between professional gambling and other organized crime . . . .”).
59. Illinois Loss Recovery Act, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28-1.1(a) (2008). Not all
forms of gambling were criminalized in the Act. See id. For example, cash prizes for bingo
games, lotteries, raffles, charitable games, and legislatively authorized pari-mutuel betting
were exempted from criminal prosecution under the act. Id.
60. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28-8(a) (2008).
61. Moushon v. AAA Amusement, Inc., 641 N.E.2d 1201, 1205 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994).
62. Id.
63. Id.

448

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

video gaming machines64 to recover her losses under the Illinois Loss Recovery Act.65 Her case went to trial, and the jury awarded Gloria $1,252 in
damages.66
Moushon is an ideal example of an Illinois citizen who was afforded
the protection that the Illinois Loss Recovery Act intended to create: protection from the adverse effects of gambling.67 If a similar claim was filed
today, however, the pathological gambler would be afforded no statutory
protection whatsoever, because this form of gambling was decriminalized
via the Video Gaming Act.68 This act not only made it legal for certain establishments to operate mini-casinos,69 but also repealed citizens’ right to
sue an establishment for these types of losses.70 Today, given Moushon’s
pathological gambling behavior and lack of mitigation on the part of the
defendant tavern owner, Moushon could theoretically sue under an Illinois
dram shop negligence theory similar to the claims filed in New Jersey.71
This claim would most likely fail, however, due to the familiar lack of legislative intent reasoning applied by New Jersey courts, because the Illinois
gaming industry is “highly regulated.”72
This trend of gambling decriminalization is nothing new to Illinois.73
The Illinois Loss Recovery Act, which once acted as an impenetrable shield
that completely protected Illinois citizens from all forms of gambling,74 is
now riddled with gaping exemptions that expose citizens to the effects of
64. Id. at 1202. The two defendants in the case “had an oral agreement to split evenly any proceeds from [the video gaming] machines.” Id. at 1205.
65. See id. at 1202.
66. Id.
67. See Illinois Loss Recovery Act, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28-1.1(a) (2009) (stating that the purpose of the statute is to “restrain persons from engaging in the business of
gambling for profit in this State,” after “[r]ecognizing the close relationship between professional gambling and other organized crime . . . .”).
68. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28-1(b)(12) (2010).
69. See Video Gaming Act, 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/1 (2010).
70. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28-8 (2008). Section 28-1 of the Loss Recovery Act
was amended by the Illinois Video Gaming Act, and created an exception to those who may
be “convicted of gambling.” Id. No such amendment was made to section 28-8 (which allows for gamblers to sue bet-takers to recover their losses), but the effect of the amendment
to section 28-1 takes establishments providing VGMs out of the definition of gamblers,
thereby taking away citizens’ right to recover because these establishments are not “gambling” as defined by the statute. See Moushon, 641 N.E.2d at 1202 (stating that the law “provides a cause of action for treble damages to the loser of certain illegal bets against the winner of the bets.”) (emphasis added).
71.
See infra notes 93-119 and accompanying text for a discussion on dram shop
liability in New Jersey.
72. See infra notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
74. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28-1 (2010). Not all forms of gambling were illegal
when the act was first codified. See Illinois Loss Recovery Act, supra note 59.
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legalized gambling.75 Since 1974, the Illinois General Assembly has exempted different forms of gambling, including the Illinois Lottery Law76
and the Riverboat Gambling Act,77 which have created the largest hole in
the citizens’ shield and threatens to further increase in size.78
III. INEFFECTIVE THEORIES OF LIABILITY
The NGISC Final Report recognized that “the presence of a gambling
facility within 50 miles roughly doubles the prevalence of problem and
pathological gamblers.”79 Accordingly, new casinos mean new pathological
gamblers who may decide to bring claims against casinos for recovery of
their losses. But what legal theory offers them protection? Common law
dram shop negligence theories have been claimed to offer protection, but
problems with legislative intent have extinguished the claims of pathological gamblers.80
Issues regarding dram shop liability in the context of casino gambling
are always the same: Whether casino patrons can recover gambling debts
when the casino continues to allow those patrons to gamble after they are
visibly intoxicated?81 This theory, however, is somewhat of a hybrid form
of the typical dram shop cause-of-action,82 where a tavern patron is served
passed the point of visible intoxication and consequently causes injury to a
third party.83 That third party may then have a claim against the tavern under the common law principles of dram shop liability for not subscribing to
its duty to refrain from serving alcohol to visibly intoxicated persons.84 This
theory requires a third party to bring the action, rather than the intoxicated

75. Id. § 28-1(b)(1)-(12).
76. See Illinois Lottery Law, 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1605/1-1605/28 (2008); Riverboat Gambling Act, 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-10/24 (2008); Video Gaming Act, 230 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 40/1-40/85 (2010).
77.
Illinois Riverboat Gambling Act, 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-10/24 (2008).
78. See discussion infra notes 133-60 and accompanying text.
79. See NGICS Final Report, supra note 6, at 4-4.
80. See infra notes 93-119 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995).
82. See Osborne v. Twin Town Bowl, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 367, 378 (Minn. 2008)
(implying that a typical dram shop cause of action involves injuries to a third-person after a
dram shop over serves a patron and that patron gets into a bar fight or a drunk driving accident).
83. See Lopez v. Maez, 651 P.2d 1269, 1272 (N.M. 1982). A typical dram shop
statute states, “[e]very person who is injured in person or property by any intoxicated person,
has a right of action in his own name, severally or jointly, against any person who by selling
or giving alcoholic liquor, causes the intoxication of such person.” Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 43, §
135 (1979).
84. See Lopez, 651 P.2d at 1275.
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patron who injures himself.85 Some jurisdictions, however, hold that a third
party need not be involved—the patron may leave the tavern and sustain
injuries to himself and still have a cause of action against the tavern. 86 As
one court put it, dram shop laws exist “to protect incompetents against their
own incompetency.”87 In this regard, some courts will entertain dram shop
claims even though no one suffered injury other than the gambler himself.88
One constant that usually appears in most dram shop cases, however, besides visible intoxication, is personal injury or destruction of property.89
Because of this, intoxicated gamblers at casinos find it difficult to recover
for their purely economic injuries.90
A. NEW JERSEY JURISPRUDENCE

The federal courts in the Third Circuit have had the challenge of determining how the New Jersey Supreme Court would rule on issues regarding recovery of gambling losses under New Jersey principles of common
law dram shop liability.91 Although the federal district’s holding in GNOC
Corp. v. Aboud allowed recovery for such losses,92 the Third Circuit took
the opposite position and determined that the New Jersey Supreme Court
would not recognize such claims.93
In GNOC Corp., Aboud was sued for the collection of a twenty-eight
thousand dollar gambling debt by GNOC. He counterclaimed and sought
two hundred and fifty thousand dollars for gambling losses he sustained
while at plaintiff’s casino.94 Aboud claimed that GNOC breached its duty of
care when it allowed him to continue to gamble after he was visibly intox85. See, e.g., Allen v. County of Westchester, 109 A.D.2d 475, 480 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985) (stating that to permit recovery for plaintiff’s injuries after drinking would allow him
“to benefit by his or her own wrongful act.”) (quoting Buntin v. Hutton, 1917 WL 2452 at *3
(Ill. App. Ct., 1917)).
86. Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 218 A.2d 630, 636 (N.J. 1966) (“[A] tavern
keeper may with equal reason be held civilly accountable for injuries which proximately
result to the patron himself.”).
87.
Galvin v. Jennings, 289 F.2d 15, 17-18 (3d Cir. 1961).
88. See, e.g., Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 293 (3d Cir.
1995).
89. See Hallam, supra note 14, at 254 (“The general rule in tort law is that a plaintiff may not recover pure economic loss that is unaccompanied by personal injury or physical destruction of property.”).
90. See, e.g., Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 294 (citing Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal
Assocs., 876 F. Supp. 625, 637 (D.N.J. 1994)).
91. See GNOC Corp. v. Aboud, 715 F. Supp. 644, 652 (D.N.J. 1989); Hakimoglu,
70 F.3d at 628; Greate Bay Hotel & Casino v. Tose, 34 F.3d 1227, 1230 (3d Cir. 1994).
92. GNOC Corp., 715 F. Supp. at 655.
93. Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 293; Tose, 34 F.3d at 1234.
94. GNOC Corp., 715 F. Supp. at 646.
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icated.95 The District Court for the District of New Jersey ruled that “[a]
casino has a duty to refrain from knowingly permitting an invitee to gamble
where that patron is obviously and visibly intoxicated . . . .”96 The court
recognized that the holding was “novel” in that it was a “logical extension”
to a typical dram shop cause of action.97 The court determined that the New
Jersey Supreme Court would rule in the same manner because Aboud’s
injuries were foreseeable to the casino (i.e., proximate causation).98 Because
questions of foreseeability should be applied in a “flexible” manner,99 the
court concluded that the facts, though unique, did not stray far enough away
from a typical dram shop case to grant GNOC’s motion for partial summary
judgment.100
The GNOC Corp. court’s determination, however, was later discredited in Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Associates.101 Though the facts of
Hakimoglu were similar,102 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded
that the New Jersey Supreme Court was unlikely to rule in favor of the
gambler in these situations.103 The court first reasoned that because the
gambling arena is highly regulated by the New Jersey Casino Control Act,
there is no private cause-of-action absent legislative intent.104 The “lack of
legislative intent” reasoning was again applied by the same circuit in
Greate Bay Hotel & Casino v. Tose.105 Again, the court reasoned that because the gambling industry is so well regulated, legislative intent could not
be inferred absent any explicit language to the contrary.106

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See id. at 651.
Id. at 655.
Id.
Id. at 652.
GNOC Corp., 715 F. Supp. at 653.
Id. at 655-56.
Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 293 (3d Cir. 1995).
See id. at 292.
[Plaintiff] alleged that the defendants had “intentionally and
maliciously enticed him” to gamble at the casinos on numerous occasions by providing him with free alcoholic beverages
and other amenities; that while he gambled he was served free
alcoholic beverages until he became intoxicated; that after he
became “visibly and obviously intoxicated” the defendants
“invited and permitted him to continue to gamble in that condition” for lengthy periods; and that he consequently incurred
“substantial gambling losses.”

Id.
103. Id. at 294.
104. Id. at 293 (citing Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 876 F. Supp. 625,
633 (D.N.J. 1994)).
105.
Greate Bay Hotel & Casino v. Tose, 34 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (3d Cir. 1994).
106. Id.
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In Taveras v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc.,107 a case with similar
facts to the above cases, the plaintiff argued for the first time that she
should be able to recover gambling losses even though she was not “visibly
intoxicated.”108 Taveras’s claim was two-fold: she claimed the casino
should have a duty to prevent intoxicated gamblers from over-gambling;109
and she asked the court to “go even further, [and] impos[e] upon casinos a
duty to stop sober casino patrons who are gambling too much.”110 The District Court for the District of New Jersey followed the reasoning in Hakimoglu and Tose for the “visibly intoxicated” portion of the claim,111 but
flat-out rejected her claim seeking damages for her gambling losses even
when she was not visibly intoxicated.112 The court reasoned that to allow
such claims would, in effect, create a slippery-slope,113 and theorized that if
the plaintiff’s reasoning was adopted, it “would impose a duty on shopping
malls and credit-card companies to identify and exclude compulsive shoppers.”114
Taveras is the most recent case that failed to stretch common law dram
shop liability to recover gambling losses by a visibly intoxicated gambler
(as well as sober gamblers), and again, the court based its reasoning on the
lack of legislative intent to provide such relief.115 Together, these cases
show that pathological gamblers are not protected due to the language of
the statutes decriminalizing the gambling activities.116 Each court implied
that protection of the pathological gambler is better taken up with the state
legislatures, rather than the judiciary.117
B.

THEORIES OF RECOVERY IN ILLINOIS

1.

The Illinois Dram Shop Act

Unlike New Jersey jurisprudence,118 Illinois courts have determined
that the Illinois Dram Shop Act is the exclusive remedy for drinking related
107.
Taveras v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., No. 07-4555 (RMB), 2008 WL 4372791, at
*1 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2008).
108. Id. at *4.
109. Id.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Id. at *3-4.
112. Taveras, 2008 WL 4372791, at *4.
113. Id. (stating that these types of claims, if allowed, would have “no limit”).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 293 (3d Cir.
1995); see also Taveras, 2008 WL 4372791, at *3-4.
117. See, e.g., Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 293; see also Taveras, 2008 WL 4372791, at
*3-4.
118. See supra notes 93-119 and accompanying text.
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injuries when a dram shop is involved.119 In this respect, if a casino patron
were to sue an Illinois casino to recover gambling losses incurred while he
was intoxicated, he would fail, because the Act provides that “[e]very person who is injured within this State . . . by any intoxicated person has a
right of action . . . against any person, licensed . . . to sell alcoholic liquor,
who, by selling or giving alcoholic liquor . . . causes the intoxication of
such person.”120 Because this act is the exclusive remedy under Illinois law,
an injury to a third party is required, and the intoxicated gambler would
have no claim against a casino in his own name.121
As originally enacted, the Illinois Dram Shop Act would provide a
narrow scope of relief for certain pathological gamblers to recover their
losses through a third party.122 Though the intoxicated gambler would be
unsuccessful in his or her own claim, a “husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or other person”123 could theoretically sue under his or her
own name due to the negligent sale of liquor to the intoxicated gambler for
loss in “means of support.”124 In Nagle v. Keller, for example, the defendant
tavern owner caused the decedent to be “habitually intoxicated” by selling
and giving him liquor, which in turn caused him to neglect his business; and
thereby rendered him unable to provide for his sister, who was dependent
on him for support.125 The sister’s claim under the previous Dram Shop Act
was upheld, and she recovered damages in connection with losing her
means of support.126 An analogous gambling scenario could involve a wife
of a pathological gambler who became visibly intoxicated at an Illinois
casino and gambled away his wife’s means of support. The wife may then
have a claim against the casino for damages equal to the means of support
lost at the casino by her husband.127 In theory, the pathological gambler was
119. Cunningham v. Brown, 174 N.E.2d 153, 156 (Ill. 1961) (“The historical background of the [Dram Shop] act seems to disclaim any notion that it was intended to compliment a common-law remedy against the tavern owners and operators.”).
120.
Illinois Dram Shop Act, 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-21 (2008).
121. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 43, § 135 (1979).
122. See the Illinois Dram Shop Act prior to amendments at 235 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/6-21 (West 2008). The current version of the law only provides relief resulting in destruction of property or personal injury to a third party. Id. Presumably, this would preclude third
parties from suing for loss in means of support. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125.
Nagle v. Keller, 86 N.E. 694, 694-95 (Ill. 1908).
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., id. The same reasoning in Nagle could theoretically be applied in this
scenario. If she could prove that the money lost by her husband was her “means of support,”
and that the money was lost due to the casino “caus[ing] . . . [her husband’s] intoxication,”
her claim would be upheld. See id. This line of reasoning would conceivably provide a wide
scope of relief to different third parties. For example, if a situation similar to the one found
in Taveras was presented to an Illinois court, the employer of the gambler could sue for
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afforded some protection through the original Illinois Dram Shop Act, but
three rather extreme elements must have been shown. The pathological
gambler must: (1) have become visibly intoxicated through the negligent
sale or furnishing of alcohol by the casino;128 (2) have shown that the money gambled was intended for the supporting another;129 and, (3) have the
third party he or she was supporting bring the suit against the casino.130
This narrow scope of relief under the previous Dram Shop Act could theoretically offer exclusive protection to a limited class of individuals. This
legal theory, however, is tenuous and does not adequately address the problem of pathological gambling.
2.

The Illinois Loss Recovery Act

Today, to recover losses from a casino in his or her own name, without
elements of intoxication or third-party means of support, a pathological
gambler in Illinois may look to the Loss Recovery Act.131 This type of
claim, similar to that in Taveras,132 could succeed under the act as originally enacted. The act has, however, been amended to create exemptions for
gambling establishments that operate under the Illinois Riverboat Gaming
Act,133 the Illinois Video Gaming Act,134 and others.135 Moreover, Senate
Bill 744, if passed, would create another exemption from the Loss Recovgambling losses, if it was found that the pathological gambler used the funds of the employer. Compare Taveras v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., No. 07-4555 (RMB), 2008 WL 4372791 at
*1 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2008) (stating that the gambler Taveras resorted to stealing escrow
money from her clients as she continued to lose money to the casino), with Nagle, 86 N.E. at
695 (“The statute gives a cause of action to any person who shall be injured in person, property, or means of support, either by an intoxicated person or in consequence of the intoxication of any person, against the person causing such intoxication.”).
128. See Illinois Dram Shop Act, 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-21 (2008).
129. See id. (requiring that the third party be injured in “means of support”).
130. See id.
131. Illinois Loss Recovery Act, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28 (2008). This statute
allows for a private cause of action against anyone who illegally takes bets. Id. Originally,
almost all forms of gambling were considered illegal, and anyone who lost an illegal bet
could sue the bet-taker and recover their losses. Id. Over time, however, this statute was
amended to create exceptions to what type of gambling is illegal as the decriminalization of
gambling grew in Illinois. See id.
132. See Taveras, 2008 WL 4372791. One claim in Taveras was for the recovery of
gambling losses independent of visible intoxication. Id. The plaintiff argued that a duty of
care was owed, but the court rejected this argument and held for the defendant. Id.
133. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28-1(b)(11) (2008); see also supra note 70.
134. See 5/28-1(b)(12).
135. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28-1(b) creates a list of exemptions from the provisions
in 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28-1(a), which defines different scenarios of illegal gambling
behavior. Compare 5/28-1(b), with 5/28-1(a). Currently there are twelve types of gambling
activities exempt from 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28-1(a) (2008).
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ery Act for casinos legally operating under the new law, which would
change the Riverboat Gaming Act to the “Illinois Casino Act.”136
3.

Common Law Contract Theory

The final remedy an Illinois pathological gambler may seek to recover
his or her losses is under a traditional common law contract theory.137 The
two New Jersey cases previously discussed138 had breach-of-contract claims
against the casinos in addition to dram shop tort liability claims.139 Thus, an
intoxicated gambler could potentially argue that his obvious intoxication
voided the gambling contract—that is, if one existed in the first place.140
Federal courts in New Jersey, however, rejected contractual arguments because “there is no mutuality” between the patron and the casino.141 The
district court in GNOC Corp. did not dismiss the breach of contract claim
against the casino, because determining whether the casino knew “the
drunk lack[ed] the capacity to understand or control his acts” was a question of fact.142
Breach-of-contract theories require two assumptions: (1) that each bet
placed by the casino patron constituted a formation of a contract; and, (2)
that the casino knew the intoxicated gambler lacked the capacity to enter
into a contract.143 The argument that each bet constitutes a formation of a
contract would be an uphill battle for the casino patron.144 The relationship
between the two parties may not be sufficient to establish definite terms of
the contract,145 and the high extent of regulation by the respective adminis136. See S.B. 744, 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); see supra note 47.
137. See Hallam, supra note 14, at 257-59.
138. See supra notes 93-119 and accompanying text.
139.
Taveras v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., No. 07-4555 (RMB), 2008 WL 4372791, at
*6 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2008) (breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and
also a claim for unjust enrichment); GNOC Corp. v. Aboud, 715 F. Supp. 644, 646 (D.N.J.
1989) (breach of contract).
140. Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 295 n.4 (D.N.J. 1995)
(Becker, J., dissenting) (“In addition to the tort theory Hakimoglu has pursued, a gambler in
his position may have a claim in contract. The gambler’s obvious intoxication, one might
argue, voided the gambling contract.”).
141. Id. (citing Taveras, No. 07-4555 (RMB), 2008 WL 4372791, at *6 n.8).
142. GNOC Corp., 715 F. Supp. at 654.
143. See, e.g., Taveras, 2008 WL 4372791, at *6 n.8 (“[T]he patron does not negotiate the terms of his relationship with the casino, nor can the patron or casino vary the rules
of the game, the odds, or the payoffs, as those [elements are regulated through the Casino
Control Commission].”).
144. See, e.g., id.
145. See Hallam, supra note 14, at 258 n.139. Hallam argues that the relationship
between the patron and casino is not definite enough, seeing as courts have rejected relationships that are far more definite than the casino–patron relationship. Id.
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trative agency may terminate any argument that common law contract formation principles still apply.146
Assuming, arguendo, that a contractual relationship did exist, to succeed on his claim for recovery of gambling losses, an intoxicated gambler
in Illinois would have to prove that “[his] drunkenness . . . drowned [his]
reason, memory, and judgment, and . . . impaired [his] mental faculties to
such an extent as to render [him] non compos mentis for the time being,”147
or that he was incapable of understanding the nature of the transaction.148
Additionally, if the patron did not become intoxicated at the casino, his
incapacitation claim would fail if the casino could prove that the patron
“knew what he or she was doing at the time and intoxication had not
drowned out reason or understanding.”149 New Jersey jurisprudence differs
in this respect because “the manner by which the gambler became intoxicated is irrelevant . . . because a contract theory would focus on the fact
that the gambler was patently intoxicated.”150 Moreover, voidable contract
claims in New Jersey are more favorable to casino patrons than Illinois,
because an Illinois casino would have to aid or procure the patrons drunkenness in some way.151 Proving this element may not be difficult under
current Illinois gambling legislation, as there are no restrictions in place
regarding the extent of alcohol consumption by gamblers at a casino.152 If
the intoxicated patron could prove these elements, each bet would thereby
be voidable, and he would be entitled to recover his losses. It is highly unlikely, however, that a plaintiff will be able to show that a contractual relationship existed in the first place, and this analysis would therefore have no
relevance.
C. NO REMEDY IN ILLINOIS

Moreover, the pathological gambler has no statutorily created protection to recover his or her gambling losses, whether the claim falls under the
146. See, e.g., Taveras, 2008 WL 4372791, at *6 n.8.
147.
Martin v. Harsh, 83 N.E. 164, 165 (Ill. 1907).
148. See generally Menkins v. Lightner, 18 Ill. 282 (Ill. 1857).
149.
Romualdo P. Eclavea et al., Physical or Mental Condition-Intoxication or Drug
Use, in 12 ILL. L. & PRAC. § 61 (Thomas Reuters 2010).
150. See Hallam, supra note 14, at 257. Hallam discusses two hypothetical situations
for recovery of gambling losses by an intoxicated person: (1) the patron entering a casino
sober, and then drinking and gambling; and (2) the patron entering a casino already intoxicated and then gambling. Id. at 252. Hallam claims that it is possible for a patron to have a
voidable contract claim in either situation. Id. at 257. Under Illinois law, however, in order
for a patron to recover under the latter hypothetical, he would need to prove that the casino
“aided or procured his drunkenness,” which would seemingly eliminate the possibility of
recovery under latter situation. Bates v. Ball, 72 Ill. 108, 110 (1874).
151. See Bates, 72 Ill. at 110.
152. See Responsible Gaming Statutes and Regulations, supra note 14, at ii.
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Illinois Dram-Shop Act,153 through illegal bet-taking under the Illinois Loss
Recovery Act,154 or from a common law contract approach.155 Under the
Illinois Dram Shop Act, a patron would not be able to sue under his own
name because the act requires destruction of property or personal injury to a
third party.156 Additionally, the same patron would not be able to sue under
the Illinois Loss Recovery Act because the relevant section has been
amended to create exemptions from new gambling legislation.157 Finally,
the common law contract approach is inadequate because of issues relating
to the relationship between the parties and whether a contract is formed
after each bet placed by the casino patron.158 Therefore, to adequately protect the growing class of pathological gamblers, the Illinois General Assembly needs to incorporate legislation intended to protect the pathological
gambler that is proportionate to the problems that decriminalized gambling
creates.
IV. EXPANDING LIABILITY WITH THE EXPANSION OF POTENTIAL HARM
Margarita Taveras asked a District Court in the Third Circuit to place a
duty of care on a casino independent of the element of visible intoxication.159 Her request was unprecedented and, unsurprisingly, rejected by that
court because her theory would have “no limit.”160 The slippery-slope reasoning given by the court also analogized pathological gambling to compulsive shopping, which is a psychiatric disorder as defined by the American
Journal of Psychiatry.161 But is that comparison accurate? Would placing a
duty of care on casinos to identify and prevent pathological gamblers from
gambling be too burdensome, and eventually lead to a situation where, for
example, a clothing store was obligated to identify compulsive shoppers
and prevent them from shopping? Professor I. Nelson Rose, a leading authority on gambling law, posed the question this way: “Are suits by compulsive gamblers like the obese plaintiff who tried to sue McDonalds? Or
are casinos taking advantage of people who are mentally ill?”162 To sort
153. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
154. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
155. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
156. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
157. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
158. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
159.
Taveras v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 2008 WL 4372791, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 19,
2008).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 4 n.6 (citing M. Lejoyeux et al., Phenomenology and Psychopathology of
Uncontrolled Buying, in 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1524 (1996)).
162. I. Nelson Rose, Compulsive Gamblers Lose Again, In Court, GAMING GURU,
June 2, 2003, http://rose.casinocitytimes.com/articles/6064.html (last visited Mar 15, 2011).
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through the questions of if and when a duty should be owed to the casino
patron, this Comment distinguishes between three different types of gamblers: (1) those gamblers who are so certain of their problem and so dedicated to preventing themselves from gambling that they have enrolled
themselves in a self-exclusion program; (2) those gamblers who demonstrate pathological gambling behavior but are not enrolled in a selfexclusion program; and, (3) those gamblers who are responsible and do not
show any indication that they have a problem with gambling.
A.

THE CASE FOR SELF-EXCLUSION

The pathological gambling problem has not been completely ignored
in Illinois.163 A portion of all tax dollars received from licensed gaming
establishments are allocated to prevent pathological gambling.164 For example, signs describing the dangers of gambling must be posted in certain
areas of a casino.165 Additionally, Illinois allocates money for employee
training, 800 numbers, and public awareness for pathological gambling.166
Perhaps the most direct way in which Illinois seeks to protect pathological gamblers is through its voluntary self-exclusion program,167 which
allows people to issue a written statement to a casino, admit that they are a
problem gambler and that they wish to be evicted from the casino if they
ever show up to gamble.168 That document is then shared with all the casinos within the state.169 Any patron that has banned himself or herself from a
casino and is found gambling in a casino is subject to arrest, and all of his
or her winnings must be donated to a problem gambling charitable organization.170 This form of protection was originally utilized by Missouri in
1996, and many states, including Illinois, have adopted this type of legislative protection.171
The self-exclusion program is unique in that it statutorily creates a duty on the part of the casino to prevent the self-excluded gambler from gambling.172 Basically, the casino will utilize all of its tools to identify the self163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See Responsible Gaming Statutes and Regulations, supra note 14, at 8-14.
See id.
See id. at ii.
Id.
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.710 (2007).
Id. § 3000.745.
Id. § 3000.760.
Id. § 3000.756.
Am. Gaming Ass’n, Self-Exclusion 101, RESPONSIBLE GAMING Q., Winter 2003.
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.770 (2007). In part, the statute states:
No licensee shall knowingly allow any person placed on the
Self-Exclusion List pursuant to Section 3000.750 to enter the
area within the admission turnstiles of, or engage in gambling
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excluded gambler, such as photographs, surveillance cameras, player’s
cards, and so on.173 Once the gambler is identified by the casino, it must
remove him or her immediately, take the self-excluded patron’s chips, and
refuse to pay out that patron’s winnings.174 The duty owed, however, is not
to the self-excluded patrons themselves, but rather to the Illinois Gaming
Board.175 In effect, breach of this duty will subject the casino to sanctions
by the Illinois Gaming Board, but the problem gambler is not afforded any
private cause of action against the casino.176
1.

Merrill v. Trump Indiana, Inc.

Self-exclusion statutes generally create a duty only from the casino to
the administrative agency regulating the industry. In Merrill v. Trump Indiana, Inc.,177 however, a federal district court in Indiana was asked to determine whether a casino owed a duty to the self-excluded patron himself under Indiana law.178 Mark Merrill was a self-proclaimed problem gambler;
and in 1996, he wrote to the defendant casino asking to be evicted if he
were to ever show up to gamble.179 Two years later, Merrill “relapsed” and
went to defendant’s casino and started gambling once again.180 Merrill then
sued the casino, and claimed that it owed him a statutorily created duty of
care to evict him upon his entrance into the casino, and that the casino
breached that duty when it failed to do so.181 The statutory construction of
Indiana’s self-exclusion program is similar to that of Illinois,182 and the
at, the riverboat gaming operation. The riverboat gaming operation shall cause the name and address of any person on the
Self-Exclusion List to be flagged on all mailing, marketing or
promotional lists or databases, except as provided in this Part.
No licensee shall knowingly send marketing or promotional
materials to any person placed on the Self-Exclusion List.
Id. § 3000.770.
173. See discussion infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
174. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.770 (2007).
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Merrill v. Trump Indiana, Inc., 320 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2003).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 730-31.
180. Id. at 731.
181. Id.
182. Compare ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.701 (2007) (“It shall be the duty of
the holder of an owner's license and of its employees to exclude or eject from a riverboat
gaming operation any excluded person when such holder or employee knows or reasonably
should know of the presence of such excluded person.”), and ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, §
3000.770 (2007) (“A licensee must immediately notify a Board agent upon making a determination that a person listed on the Self-Exclusion List has entered the area within the admission turnstiles of a riverboat gaming operation and remove the person from the riverboat
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court concluded that the regulation in question did not provide for a private
cause of action.183 Once again, a federal district court, applying state law,
had to determine how the high court of that state would rule on an issue —
and determined that because gaming is such a highly regulated industry, no
private-cause-of action would be allowed absent legislative intent.184 The
court recognized that “Trump's obligation to follow regulations promulgated by the Indiana Gaming Commission does not automatically translate into
a duty of care owed to compulsive gamblers. At most, the rules impose
upon Trump a duty to the state through the gaming commission, not to a
self-requesting evictee.”185 Merrill also argued that the casino owed him a
common law duty of care, but that argument was rejected by the court after
it alluded to Indiana dram shop liability absent injury to third persons.186
It is not surprising that the Merrill court found that there was no duty
owed by the casino to the self-excluded patron himself, especially when
compared to cases like Hokomoglu and Taveras.187 The Merrill court, algaming operation.”) (emphasis added), with 68 IND. ADMIN. CODE 6-1-1, 6-3-4 (2005) (stating that “[a] riverboat licensee or operating agent shall be subject to disciplinary action [by
the Indiana Gaming Commission] for failure to comply with the requirements of this section
. . . .” and that “[a] casino licensee or operating agent must evict any excluded person from
its gaming area if the casino licensee or operating agent knows or reasonably should know
that the person is an excluded person.”), and Merrill, 320 F.3d at 732 (“Trump's obligation
to follow regulations promulgated by the Indiana Gaming Commission does not automatically translate into a duty of care owed to compulsive gamblers. At most, the rules impose upon
Trump a duty to the state through the gaming commission, not to a self-requesting evictee.”).
183. Merrill, 320 F.3d at 732.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 732.
186. Id. at 733. The court’s reasoning for denying that a common law duty of care
existed came after an analysis regarding a typical dram shop cause of action. Id. In Indiana, a
tavern owner will only be held liable for injuries sustained in connection with negligent sale
of alcohol if the injuries are to a third person, rather than injuries to the tavern patron himself. Id. (citing Davis v. Stinson, 508 N.E.2d 65, 68 (Ind. App. Ct. 1987)). Because Indiana
does not provide protection for drunk drivers who injure themselves, the court reasoned that
the Indiana Supreme Court would not allow compulsive gamblers to recover their own economic losses. Merrill, 320 F.3d at 733.
187. Compare id. at 733 (“Trump's obligation to follow regulations promulgated by
the Indiana Gaming Commission does not automatically translate into a duty of care owed to
compulsive gamblers. At most, the rules impose upon Trump a duty to the state through the
gaming commission, not to a self-requesting evictee.”), with Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal
Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 293 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Extending common law dram-shop liability into
an area so fully regulated, without a glimmer of legislative intent, is not a predictable extension of common law tort principles, and has not been foreshadowed by the New Jersey
courts.”) (citing Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 876 F. Supp. 625, 633 (D.N.J.
1994)), and Taveras v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 2008 WL 4372791, at *4 n.5 (D.N.J. Sept.
19, 2008) (“Notably, while patrons may voluntarily place their names on lists of persons to
be excluded from casinos, state law expressly absolves casinos from liability for failure to
exclude these self-identified persons from gambling.” (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-71.2(c)
(West 2009)).
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though it dealt with a slightly different situation involving a self-exclusion
program and not with the element of alcohol, looked to the way in which
the gaming industry is regulated in the state and found that there could be
no duty to the patron absent legislative intent.188 Indiana gaming regulations, like those governing the Illinois gaming industry, do not impose a
duty on the casino to the self-excluded patron, but only a duty to the administrative agency that oversees the industry.189 But would imposing a duty to
the self-excluded patrons be too burdensome on the casinos? Are casinos in
the best position to exclude self-proclaimed problem gamblers?
2.

Reasonableness of Duty to Self-excluded Patrons

The case of Mark Merrill demonstrates a perfect example of inadequate measures taken by a state to protect pathological gamblers. Before his
actual run-in with the casino, Merrill enrolled himself in a clinic for problem gamblers in Illinois.190 That clinic then wrote to certain casinos and
asked them to remove Merrill should he ever show up to gamble.191 Finally,
Merrill wrote the casino himself and asked to be removed if he ever entered
the casino, perhaps for the purpose of protecting himself in case he relapsed.192 The steps Merrill took to alleviate himself from the adverse impacts of legalized gambling exemplify his status as a citizen fearful of the
potential harm that might occur directly to him through state action of decriminalized gambling. Trump Indiana, Inc. at least should have known that
Merrill was on its eviction list. When it failed to evict him, it was only subject to sanctions by the Indiana Gaming Commission and Merrill was left
with no remedy.193 Interestingly, if an Illinois casino fails to evict a selfexcluded gambler, the patron will either lose money, while gambling (al188. Merrill, 320 F.3d at 732.
189. See id.; see also ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.770 (2007).
190. Merrill, 320 F.3d at 731.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 733. The court compared Merrill’s claim to that of a typical dram shop
case where a tavern patron drank to the point of visible intoxication at a bar, drove home,
and sustained injuries to himself. Id. The court concluded that Indiana law does not allow
liability to tavern owners in this type of situation because of the absence of injury to a third
party by the drunk driver. Id. For a discussion on the court’s comparison of casino’s dram
shop and self-exclusion liability, see Justin E. Bauer, Comment, Self-Exclusion and the
Compulsive Gambler: The House Shouldn’t Always Win, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 63, 79-82
(2006). Bauer highlights that this type of comparison fails in two respects: proximate causation and foreseeability. Id. at 80-81. Bauer also argues that, in Indiana, it is in the best interest for the casino to not evict a self-excluded gambler because the winnings that the patron
receives will be forfeited to the Gaming Commission by the casino, and “the more money
the commission receives as remitted funds, the more lenient that commission may be when
enforcing sanctions on the casino in violation of the self-exclusion regulations.” Id. at 72.
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lowing the casino to benefit), or the patron will win money while gambling
(allowing the casino to take back the money and donate it to the patron’s
charitable organization).194
Some may argue that imposing a duty on casinos to self-excluded patrons imposes too high of a burden on casinos.195 Given the advanced technological improvements in surveillance and the application of those improvements to casino gaming, however, requiring casinos to exclude compulsive gamblers is not an unreasonable request.196 Today, surveillance
equipment is used to recognized gamblers as they enter and leave the casino
via face-recognition technology.197 One source reported that there are
“thousands of surveillance cameras and devices in each casino [that] capture virtually every chip, slot machine, employee, customer, and area of the
gambling facility (including elevators and hotel facilities).”198 Casinos have
also utilized another way of tracking gamblers entering their casino through
the use of “player’s cards,” which allow the casino to compile data regarding how much they are spending and on what machines.199
Casinos have no problem spending large quantities of money to protect themselves from cheaters that illegally cut into their profits. Some of
the money is allocated by casinos to collect data regarding which machines
are being played by what type of players.200 Imposing a duty on casinos to
recognize and evict self-excluded gamblers is a reasonable extension of the
use of their already state-of-the-art technology, and doing so would have
the effect of offering greater protection to self-excluded gamblers. People,
like Mark Merrill, need this increase in protection to assist them in mitigat194. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.770 (2007).
195. See Bauer, supra note 193, at 82 (citing Joy Wolfe, Comment, Casinos and the
Compulsive Gambler: Is There a Duty to Monitor the Gambler’s Wagers?, 64 MISS. L.J.
687, 693 (1995)).
196. See John Warren Kindt, “The Insiders” for Gambling Lawsuits: Are the Games
“Fair” and Will Casinos and Gambling Facilities Be Easy Targets for Blueprints for RICO
and Other Causes of Action?, 55 MERCER L. REV. 529, 544 (2004). For a more comprehensive discussion on a casino’s ability to recognize and evict self-excluded gamblers using
advanced technology, see Bauer, supra note 193, at 82-84.
197. See Bauer, supra note 193, at 82.
198.
Diana Digges, Casino-Related Litigation on the Rise, LAW. WKLY. USA, Nov.
26, 2001, at 17.
199. See Bauer, supra note 194, at 83 (citing S.C. Gwynne, The Gambling Industry is
Creating High-Tech Databases to Reel in Compulsive Players, TIME, Nov. 17, 1997, at 69).
200. See generally id. at 82-84. Bauer argues that casinos do have the ability to identify and remove self-excluded gamblers. Id. He suggests that the problem with a casino’s
ability to exclude these gamblers is easily solved by requiring “casino personnel to check the
identification card of every person who enters the casino to determine if they are on the selfexclusion list.” Id. at 84. The argument is supported by the fact that Illinois recently created
a program “that will require all riverboat casinos in the state to check the identification cards
of all patrons who appear to be under the age of 30.” Id. (citing Chris Fusco, Illinois Casinos
to Check IDs for Addicts, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 23, 2006, at 18).
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ing the temptations of their increasingly-recognized disorder of pathological
gambling.
B. DISTINGUISHING WHEN A DUTY IS OWED

Self-exclusion programs are unique in that they give written statewide
notice to casinos of self-proclaimed problem gamblers.201 A self-excluded
gambler is one who takes advantage of the most direct and effective form of
protection offered by the state of Illinois. Enrollment in the program is an
indication of the highest degree that each person has a self-proclaimed
problem with gambling and that each person is taking substantial steps in
order to be protected. Imposing a duty of care by the casino to the selfexcluded patron is a logical extension that offers adequate protection to
problem gamblers enrolled in the program. The truth of the matter is, however, that not all problem gamblers are on the self-exclusion list and determining whether a duty is owed to this class of gamblers is a different issue.
It would without a doubt be a difficult task for a casino to distinguish
who among their patrons is gambling responsibly while enjoying the thrills
of a casino, and who is gambling away their entire paycheck in the hopes of
achieving massive wealth in a pathological manner. Identifying pathological gamblers, however, is not as difficult as it once was, with many well
disseminated academic studies and reports on the disorder now available.202
The National Council on Problem Gambling has identified certain characteristics that problem gamblers demonstrate, like “increasing preoccupation
with gambling, a need to bet more money more frequently, restlessness or
irritability when attempting to stop, ‘chasing’ losses, and loss of control
manifested by continuation of the gambling behavior in spite of mounting,
serious, negative consequences.”203 In fact, the NGISC Final Report recommended that states who choose to legalize gambling should “[c]ontract
with a state-recognized gambling treatment professional to train management and staff to develop strategies for recognizing and addressing customers whose gambling behavior may strongly suggest they may be experiencing serious to severe difficulties.”204
201. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 3000.710 (2007) (“The Board shall maintain a list of
persons to be ejected or excluded from a riverboat gaming operation. This list shall be
known as the Board Exclusion List. The list shall be distributed to each riverboat gaming
operation, which shall acknowledge receipt of the list in writing.”).
202. See, e.g., Kindt, supra note 196; Bauer, supra note 194; Hallam, supra note 14.
203.
Nat’l Council Problem Gambling, What is Problem Gambling?,
http://www.ncpgambling.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=1 (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
204. NGISC Final Report, supra note 6, at 4-19. Additionally, the Commission recommended that “[u]nder a state ‘hold harmless’ statute, [casinos should] refuse service to
any customer whose gambling behavior convincingly exhibits indications of problem or
pathological gambling.” Id.
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When the plethora of information regarding problem gambling is
combined with the NGISC Final Report recommendations, it is not unreasonable to suggest that casinos should owe a duty to prevent their patrons
from continuing to gamble after indications of problem gambling are recognized (or reasonably should have been recognized) by the casino. This is
particularly true when there is malicious conduct on the part of the casino to
induce the vulnerable gambler into gambling even more. For example, in
Taveras, the plaintiff alleged that “casino employees ‘refused to permit
[her] family members from taking her home,’ and continued to allow her to
gamble in spite of clear indications that she was a compulsive gambler,
confirmed by information about her condition provided to casino employees by her brother.”205 Similarly, in GNOC Corp., Aboud ran out of
money at the casino, and the casino then flew him “by helicopter to his
bank in Queens, New York . . . so that [he] could withdraw more money
and bring it back to Atlantic City.”206 These situations exemplify pathological gamblers exhibiting clear indications of their disorder to the casinos,
while casinos escape any sort of liability.
The third class of gamblers, those who gamble responsibly, would undoubtedly be found in the courtroom in an attempt to recover their losses
(or as I. Nelson Rose would put it, would be found suing McDonald’s due
to their obesity),207 if this type of duty was imposed on casinos to gamblers
not on the self-exclusion list. In order to prevent this flood-of-claims problem, the statutory construction of the duty in these situations should not
only require knowledge that a gambler is exhibiting pathological tendencies
toward gambling, but also some sort of malice on the part of the casino as
demonstrated in Taveras and GNOC Corp. Malicious conduct, for example,
would include a casino recognizing a patron on its self-exclusion list but
failing to evict that patron. This would accelerate the goals of the selfexclusion law and force casinos to adhere to its purpose. Non-self-excluded
gamblers, who do in fact exhibit pathological gambling behavior, would be
able to succeed on a claim against the casino, if that gambler can show malicious conduct by the casino similar to the extreme casino behavior found
in Taveras and GNOC Corp. Without allegations that the casino maliciously furthered the casino patron’s problem (which would not include simply
allowing that patron to continue to gamble, or continuing to serve that patron drinks), frivolous claims would not survive the pleadings stage.

205.
Taveras v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., No. 07-4555 (RMB), 2008 WL 4372791, at
*1 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2008).
206. GNOC Corp. v. Aboud, 715 F. Supp. 644, 647 (D.N.J. 1989).
207. I. Nelson Rose, Compulsive Gamblers Lose Again, In Court, GAMING GURU
(June 2, 2003), http://rose.casinocitytimes.com/articles/6064.html.
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V. CONCLUSION
Several authorities have analyzed situations in which pathological
gamblers may recover their losses and have looked to whether the courts
were accurate in making their determinations.208 Courts that have dealt with
this issue, however, which have mainly been federal courts applying state
law and predicting how the high court in that state would rule, have consistently held that the gaming industry is too highly regulated to infer any sort
of legislative intent supporting a private cause-of-action.209 Legalized gambling in Illinois is no different in this regard from gaming in New Jersey or
Indiana. The Illinois Gaming Board oversees the industry and, indeed,
gambling in Illinois is highly regulated. Additionally, there currently is no
remedy for pathological gamblers to recover from casinos losses that were
incurred because of their disorder. Future plaintiffs will no doubt end up in
federal court under diversity jurisdiction, and federal districts will be forced
to conclude that imposing a duty on casinos to compulsive gamblers must
be a decision made by the Illinois General Assembly (i.e., the Illinois Gaming Board). For this reason, inaction on the part of the Illinois General Assembly will have the effect of mandating a law stating that pathological
gamblers cannot recover their losses from casinos in any circumstances.
This type of law is unjust and in conflict with the increasingly recognized
disorder of pathological gambling.
With Illinois’ rapid decriminalization of gambling, and its potential to
be the number one gaming-dependent state in the United States, the Illinois
General Assembly should revive the Illinois Loss Recovery Act and include
a private cause-of-action for casino patrons against casinos. If allowed, casinos would adjust their current policies toward pathological gambling and,
in the process, curtail the negative societal effects that legalized gambling
has on the public. Overall, this type of legislation would have the impact of
allowing the high revenues generated by legalized gambling, while minimizing the harm that it creates.
MATTHEW J. DOWD
208.

See generally Bauer, supra note 193, at 82; see also Hallam, supra note 14, at

257.
209. See supra notes 93-119 and accompanying text.
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